This paper examines ideas about possible ways in which the extent of women's autonomy, women's economic dependency, and other aspects of their position vis-h-vis men influence fertility in Third World populations. Women's position or "status" seems likely to be related to the supply of children because of its links with age at marriage. Women's position may also affect the demand for children and the costs of fertility regulation, though some connections suggested in the literature are implausible. The paper ends with suggestions for future research."
Social Position and Fertility between women's position and demographic patterns: on h o w women's position vis-~t-vis men influences fertility. Demographers have long sought to explain variation in fertility, especially the secular decline of fertility associated with the modern demographic transition. The general idea that fertility is at least in part determined by the extent to which w o m e n of reproductive age are able to act on their own behalf, are economically independent of men, or are in some other way equal or inferior to m e n has existed for several decades. Thus far, however, more specific ideas about the possible impact of female autonomy or status on fertility have remained scattered in the literature. No single, agreed-upon theory of gender relations and fertility has arisen. In what follows, ideas (arid secondarily evidence) about the ways in which gender inequality may influence fertility in developing countries are reviewed in order to make clearer the likely paths of influence.
As has been noted elsewhere (Dixon, 1975 (Dixon, , 1978 Mason, 1984 Mason, , 1986 , the concept of women's "status" or position is extremely confused. Alternative terms, such as "gender inequality," "status of women," "sexual stratification," "female autonomy," "female dependency," and "male dominance" are frequently used interchangeably. To add to the confusion, single terms are often given alternative meanings. For example, the term "status" is used by some individuals to refer to women's versus men's average position across a variety of social, economic, and political hierarchies, but is used by others to refer specifically to women's relative prestige, that is, the respect or esteem accorded them by virtue of their gender. The resulting confusion about terminology means that the precise factor hypothesized to be a determinant of fertility levels or change is often unclear. Knowing whether a particular empirical analysis has measured "women's position" in a reasonable way is, in these cases, difficult.
Further confusion about the definition and hence proper empirical study of women's position exists because of disagreement as to whether it is the social institutions of gender that constrain virtually all members of a population or instead the positions of individual w o m e n on certain social hierarchies that are most important for fertility. Some authors (Cain, 1984; Caldwell, 1986; Smith, 1986) are clear in arguing that it is the social institutions of gender that influence fertility, rather than the positions of individual w o m e n that result in part from these institutions but that also result from a variety of other factors, including the social class or caste of the family, the personalities of family members, and so on. Other authors are unclear on this issue or imply that it is women's socioeconomic positions that are likely to determine their fertility. This disagreement has important implications for the level of analysis at which empirical studies of w o m e n ' s position and fertility should be conducted (Smith, 1986) . Until it is settled, it too contributes to the difficulty of judging w h e t h e r particular studies do or do not p r o v i d e relevant tests of existing ideas a b o u t the impact of w o m e n ' s "position" on fertility.
Finally, alternative theories of fertility d e t e r m i n a t i o n p o i n t to different aspects of w o m e n ' s position vis-~t-vis m e n as i m p o r t a n t for fertility. For example, in Cain's ( 1 9 8 4 ) theory of children as a potential source of social security, it is w o m e n ' s e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c y on m e n that is argued to b e critical. In Caldwell's ( 1 9 8 2 ) t h e o r y of c h i l d r e n as a potential source of wealth (also see Degler, 1980; Dyson and Moore, 1983) , it is reproducing w o m e n ' s decision-making autonomy in relation to male family m e m b e r s or their mothers-in-law that is important. Measuring either of these d i m e n s i o n s at the individual, household, c o m m u n i t y , o r societal level is difficult enough. W h e n one adds the ambiguity of w h e t h e r the p r o p e r d i m e n s i o n has b e e n measured, the difficulties of judging the significance or implications of particular studies are magnified. Because these fundamental disagreements about the i n d e p e n d e n t variable make it difficult to c o n d u c t a standard r e v i e w of the literature, this p a p e r emphasizes ideas. The e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g or c o n t r a d i c t i n g these ideas is de-emphasized, t h o u g h w h e r e clear-cut e v i d e n c e is available, it is noted. Unfortunately, p r e c i s e l y w h a t involves an inter-gender rather than intra-gender c o m p a r i s o n is frequently unclear. Take, for example, the case o f female e d u c a t i o n and e m p l o y m e n t . Although s o m e authors argue that the level of female e d u c a t i o n o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in p r o d u c t i v e (especially w a g e ) e m p l o y m e n t is irrelevant to w o m e n ' s p o s i t i o n unless it is c o n t r a s t e d w i t h m e n ' s e d u c a t i o n o r e m p l o y m e n t , o t h e r s argue that absolute levels o f schooling or e m p l o y m e n t are t h e m s e l v e s indicative Following current usage (e.g., Dyson and Moore, 1983; Caldwell, 1986) , the term "female autonomy" is used here to refer to power relations between the sexes, especially within households and families. The normal condition in contemporary societies appears to be male control of female family members rather than equality or female control of males; hence, the extent of women's autonomy from male control or from the control of male representatives such as the mother-in-law is a natural way in which to phrase intersex power relations. The terms "female dependency" and "female resources" will be used to refer to the extent to which women are economically or materially dependent on male family members. Although female autonomy and dependency or resources are positively correlated, they are conceptually distinct, as historical examples in which women enjoyed relatively high levels of autonomy despite their dependency suggest (e.g., Degler, 1980) . of the a u t o n o m y or d e p e n d e n c y that w o m e n are likely to enjoy in relation to men. Thus literacy is said to give w o m e n access to k n o w l e d g e that i m p r o v e s their bargaining p o s i t i o n in relation to men, even if m e n typically are e d u c a t e d at a m o r e a d v a n c e d level. Still o t h e r authors (Caldwell, 1986) argue that n e i t h e r e d u c a t i o n nor e m p l o y m e n t are dir e c t indicators of female status or autonomy, regardless of w h e t h e r they" are m e a s u r e d in absolute t e r m s or in c o m p a r i s o n w i t h men. It is ext r e m e l y difficult to d e c i d e a p r i o r i w h i c h of these positions is correct. Here, ideas or e v i d e n c e involving w o m e n ' s e d u c a t i o n o r e m p l o y m e n t are n o t e d only if the p o s i t e d relationships to fertility s e e m likely to in-2 volve the p o w e r , resources, or prestige of w o m e n in relation to men. T h e effects on fertility o f w o m e n ' s e d u c a t i o n or e m p l o y m e n t p e r se are b e y o n d o u r purview.
Although this p a p e r takes an eclectic a p p r o a c h to the definition of w o m e n ' s position, the r e v i e w that follows is b o u n d e d by a focus o n the p o s i t i o n of w o m e n in relation to men. The c o n c e r n h e r e is w i t h the p o w e r relations of two b r o a d classes of h u m a n i t y or w i t h their rel-
The following discussion is organized a c c o r d i n g to the National A c a d e m y of Science's f r a m e w o r k of fertility d e t e r m i n a n t s (Bulatao and Lee, 1983: Ch. 1). Table 1 lists the i n t e r m e d i a t e fertility d e t e r m i n a n t s from this f r a m e w o r k that are potentially influenced b y w o m e n ' s position. As the table shows, the n u m b e r of c h i l d r e n b o r n reflects three major factors: ( 1 ) the supply of children, that is, h o w m a n y c h i l d r e n will b e b o r n in the a b s e n c e of d e l i b e r a t e fertility control; ( 2 ) the de-TABLE 1. I n t e r m e d i a t e Fertility D e t e r m i n a n t s Potentially I n f l u e n c e d b y W o m e n ' s Social Position. Cochrane's (1979) excellent review of education and fertility pays relatively little attention to the possible consequences of education that operate through a shift in women's power, resources, or prestige vis-a-vis men. This is partly because, as Cochrane notes, the relative power of husbands and wives in fertility decision making has ambiguous implications for fertility unless one sex consistently desires fewer children than does the other, an issue that Cochrane understandably regards as beyond the scope of her review.
mand for children, i.e., how many children are desired; and (3) fertility regulation and decision making. Each of these major determinants in turn is a function of more specific variables. For example, the supply of children rdlec~ women's exposure to sexual intercourse, which in most studies is treated as synonymous with their exposure to marriage and with practices such as breastfeeding that affect women's ability to conceive or carry a pregnancy to term. 3
EFFECTS OF WOMEN'S POSITION ON THE SUPPLY OF CHILDREN Female Age at First Marriage
In the developing countries, female age at marriage usually has an inverse relationship to fertility, primarily because it influences the proportion of the reproductive years that w o m e n are exposed to sexual intercourse. Figure 1 illustrates the main paths througth which female autonomy has been hypothesized to influence age at marriage. The extent of women's freedom of action or decision making is thought to influence age at marriage through four intermediate variables. These effects may be direct or may operate indirectly through women's education and premarital employment. (Most studies have found education and employment positively related to the average age at which w o m e n marry in developing countries; see Smith, 1983 .) The four intermediate variables are:
1. Size o f D o w r y . In societies with the institution of dowry, female educational levels are usually positively associated with the size of the dowry; in non-dowry societies, they are often positively associated with other types of marriage expenses. Both of these may increase the age at which young women first marry by increasing the time needed to accumulate a sufficient dowry (Lindenbaum, 1981) .4 2. A r r a n g e d Marriages. Female education and the extent to which young w o m e n enjoy freedom of action or decision making are both thought to influence age at marriage by affecting whether marriages are arranged or instead contracted romantically. Arranged marriages tend to occur at an earlier age than marriages contracted by the partners themselves (Dixon, 1975; Dyson and Moore, 1983) , often because of parental desires to preserve women's sexual purity in arranged marriage 3 The list in Table 1 omits variables that are thought to have little quantitative impact on fertility (e.g., female nutritional levels, which appear to affect the supply of children only under extreme conditions; Bongaarts, 1980) or that are unlikely to be influenced by women's position. 4 In a dowry system, causation may also run in the reverse direction. The older the bride, the more dowry parents may have to offer in order to find her a partner.
• (Cain, 1984) . Education is also thought to westernize women's views of the family. This, too, may p r o m o t e a desire to marry romantically rather than by arrangement and may consequently lead to a postp o n e m e n t of marriage (Caldwell, 1983) . 3 . -4 . W o m e n ' s D e s i r e o r Ability to Work; P a r e n t a l D e s i r e s t o P r o l o n g D a u g h t e r s ' E m p l o y m e n t . Female autonomy and premarital employment are thought to influence both women's and parents' desires to postpone marriage. In cultures that expect married w o m e n to contribute economically to their in-laws' household, parents whose daughters are capable of working for pay may try to delay the daughter's marriage in order to prolong their enjoyment of her earnings (Salaff and Wong, 1977) . Where w o m e n work before marriage (itself determined in part by the extent to which they are given the freedom to leave the confines of the home), the experience of working may affect their own aspirations and attitudes (Blake, 1965; Salaff and Wong, 1977) . Earning a paycheck may give w o m e n a taste for independence, thereby promoting a later age at marriage; it may also encourage a desire to marry romantically or enhance w o m e n ' s ability to do so (Salaff, 1981 ) .
The broken paths in Figure 1 indicate the controversy over whether it is female autonomy that influences age at marriage or, instead, age at marriage that influences female autonomy. This controversy may be more apparent than real, arising in part because different authors focus on different levels of analysis or on female autonomy at distinct points in the life cycle. If one thinks in terms of individuals, then h o w much schooling a young woman has had, or whether she has worked for pay before marrying, may well influence the extent of her autonomy as a wife after marrying. So, too, might the age at which she marries. On the other hand, at an institutional level, whether w o m e n generally are secluded and controlled or are instead given freedom of action and decision making seems likely to influence their marriage age through the paths shown. Viewed in this way, the primary causal paths illustrated in Figure 1 seem plausible. Studies designed to test these paths at an institutional (i.e., aggregate) level would be highly worthwhile. Marital D i s r u p t i o n a n d Remarriage Like age at marriage, marital disruption and remarriage are considered here as potential determinants of child supply-because they affect exposure to sexual intercourse. The potential impact of gender inequality on these variables has largely been ignored in the social demographic literature. Moreover, a glance at comparative divorce statistics suggests there is no simple cross-national relationship between gender inequality and the incidence of marital disruption. Countries as diverse in their gender systems as Egypt and the United States have very similar divorce rates (United Nations, 1984:720) .
The literature does suggest, however, that womeri's control of material resources may be positively related to the incidence of marital disruption, hence negatively related to fertility. A study by Ackerman (1964) , for example, suggests that divorce rates tend to be higher in societies where kinship organization gives w o m e n a natal kin group on whom they can rely for economic support than in societies where women are fully incorporated into the husband's kin group. Also, Hull (1977) has suggested that one reason lower class w o m e n in Central Java have a higher incidence of divorce than middle class w o m e n is that lower class w o m e n usually work for pay and consequently are not entirely dependent on the husband's support for their survival. (A similar hypothesis has been posited for the United States where women's occupational status is positively related to the proportion divorced; see Havens, 1973 .) The idea that women's economic autonomy encourages or facilitates marital disruption seems plausible, although under extreme conditions of male control, divorce rates may be high precisely because men do not have to obtain permission from the wife or her kin group to initiate a divorce. Studies focusing on such intricacies in the relationship between female dependency and divorce or remarriage clearly are needed.
Breastfeeding
In non-contracepting populations, the incidence, duration, and intensity of breasffeeding can strongly influence the supply of children and hence fertility (Bongaarts, 1982) . Both female education and employment have frequently been cited as important determinants of breastfeeding behavior. The significance of these variables for fertility remains unclear, however, as does their relationship to women's autonomy or dependency. Although the statistical association between female education and breastfeeding seems to be consistently negative in both developing and developed countries (Nag, 1983) , the effects on fertility of this relationship often are small because better-educated w o m e n use contraception at high enough rates to compensate for the lost anovulatory effects of breasffeeding. One reason that women's autonomy per se may encourage a reduction in breasffeeding is ff autonomy encourages innovative behavior (as Caldwell, 1986 , has suggested) a n d ff adopting new forms of infant feeding is innovative in a given cultural context. Studies exploring the link between women's position and breasffeeding are needed.
Whether women's gainful emplo)anent influences breasffeeding and whether such effects operate through female autonomy or dependency are equally controversial. Mthough studies of Malaysia and the Philippines suggest that type or location of work may affect the intensity or duration of breasffeeding (Nag, 1983) , analysis of World Fertility Survey data from eight countries Clain and Bongaarts, 1981) claims to have found no effects of type or fact of employment on the duration of breastfeeding. 5 Moreover, Van Esterik and Greiner (1981) report that very few w o m e n cite their employment as a reason for abandoning or avoiding breastfeeding. They suggest that women's employment is much overrated as an explanation for declines in breasffeeding. After reviewing the literature on women's work and breastfeeding, Nag (1983) concludes that the location of work probably h-lfluences the intensity of breasffeeding, even it ff does not influence its incidence or duration. This effect, however, seems wholly mechanical, having to do with the difficulties of feeding a baby while working away from home, rather than with inequality between the sexes. Thus the impact of women's position on fertility via breasffeeding seems questionable, unless in social systems that give w o m e n relatively great freedom of action and choice, w o m e n choose bottle feeding as a form of innovative behavior.
In sum, women's autonomy indeed seems likely to influence the supply of children, primarily by affecting age at marriage. In some cir-5 JaJn and Bongaarts' results are actually somewhat more complex than they portray them to be. In two countries--Bangladesh and Panama--women who worked away from home ceased breasffeeding five to six months sooner than did those working on a family farm, a difference estimated net of the wife's education, urban-rural residence, and the husband's occupation. The effects of employment away from home in the remaining six countries were much smaller, however. 
EFFECTS OF WOMEN'S POSITION ON THE DEMAND FOR CHILDREN
G e n d e r P r e f e r e n c e s
The usual assumption in the d e m o g r a p h i c literature is that the position of w o m e n as c o m p a r e d w i t h m e n directly influences the perc e i v e d value of sons versus daughters and h e n c e d e t e r m i n e s parental p r e f e r e n c e s for c h i l d r e n of each g e n d e r ( A r n o l d and Idu, 1986). W h e r e the roles o f w o m e n and m e n are relatively undifferentiated and w o m e n c o n t r o l i m p o r t a n t resources, parents will p r e s u m a b l y p e r c e i v e male and female c h i l d r e n to have a m o r e equal value than in settings characterized by m o r e e x t r e m e forms of g e n d e r differentiation and inequality. The e x t e n t to w h i c h parents do or do not p r e f e r c h i l d r e n of one g e n d e r over c h i l d r e n of the o t h e r may in turn influence fertility if the following c o n d i t i o n s hold: ( 1 ) p a r e n t s typically desire relatively small families; ( 2 ) parents typically c o n t r o l their fertility, i.e., use s o m e means to stop bearing c h i l d r e n w h e n a d e s i r e d parity level o r sex c o m p o s i t i o n has b e e n reached; and ( 3 ) sex p r e f e r e n c e s are strong and involve c o m b i n a t i o n s or n u m b e r s of boys and girls that are unlikely to o c c u r w i t h i n the desired parity (Williamson, 1983) .
In principle, then, populations such as Korea's or Taiwan's in which average d e s i r e d family size has fallen dramatically and fertility regulation has b e c o m e c o m m o n , b u t in w h i c h a desire for sons remains strong, may e x p e r i e n c e a leveling-off of fertility above r e p l a c e m e n t b e c a u s e of 6 One of the few studies to relate indicators of women's position to child supply, child demand, and fertility regulation simultaneously--and to total fertility--was conducted for the state of Tamil Nadu, India, for the 1970 -1980 period (Jejeebhoy, 1986 . In 1970, when Tamil Nadu was relatively undeveloped, female education and the age difference between spouses (Jejeebhoy's primary indicators of female status) were positively related to the supply of children, primarily because higher status women were less likely to breasffeed and were more likely to be fecund than were thcir lower status counterparts. In 1980, however, the effects on child supply had shifted, primarily because higher status women tended to postpone marriage. strong preferences for boys (Chang, Freedman, and Sun, 1981; Williamson, 1976) . In practice, however, the example of both Korea and Taiwan suggests that sex preferences may have litde impact on fertility'. In both Taiwan and Korea, fertility ks now at or below the replacement level (Chang, Freedman, and Sun, 1987; Population Reference Bureau, 1986) . Despite strong son preferences expressed in past surveys, Taiwanese and Korean couples are currently bearing children at an extremely low rate. 7
If the impact of sex preferences on fertility is questionable for low fertility countries like Taiwan and Korea, it is even more questionable for high fertility countries like Bangladesh, where the number of children desired by couples remains large and fertility regulation is relatively rare. In Bangladesh, son preferences are very strong indeed (Ahmed, 1981) , but these preferences appear to have little impact on fertility (Ben-Porath and Welch, 1972; Bairagi and Langsten, 1986) . In principle, however, sex preferences are potentially relevant to fertility levels in any country that undergoes demographic modernization. In particular, a strong preference for sons may act as a drag on fertility decline as a population adopts fertility regulation and otherwise experiences a dedining demand for children (Cain, 1984) .
Although most authors seem to assume that sex preferences reflect something about a society's gender role system, there is little understanding of the factors that determine these preferences in a given population (see Williamson, 1976 , who reviews the available evidence without reaching any definitive conclusion about the determinants of son or daughter preferences in developing countries). Mead Cain's work on Bangladesh (Cain, 1978 (Cain, , 1980 (Cain, , 1984 Cain, Khanam, and Nahar, 1979) suggests that the seclusion of w o m e n and their inability to be economically serf-supporting lies at the root of a very strong preference for male children among rural Bangladeshi women. It is gender inequality in the control of material resources, in other words, that Cain identifies as critical. s Whether women's economic dependency-on men can alone explain cross-cultural variation in sex preferences is unclear, however. Indeed, it seems likely that other factors enter into the equation (see Wil-Y In Taiwan, at least, the preference for sons has weakened (but has not disappeared) during the period that fertility has fallen to below-replacement levels; see Chang, Freedman, and Sun, 1987. 8 .An alternative hypothesis for why parents in Bangladesh value sons has been offered by Lindenbaum (1981) . She suggests that it is sons' value as inheritors and workers of land that leads them to be highly valued (perhaps by fathers more than by mothers, although she does not make this clear). This hypothesis, however, seems inconsistent with Ahmed's (1981) finding that son preferences basically do not vary by socioeconomic characteristics in Bangladesh. liamson, 1976:19-24) . For example, Bulatao (1975) finds that parents in the Philippines value both sons and daughters for economic reasons, but for different ones; sons because of their potential contributions to income and daughters because of their potential contributions to work in the household (the Philippines is one of the few countries where w o m e n prefer daughters over sons; see Williamson, 1983) . Because daughters typically help their mothers with household chores throughout the Third World, one must ask why this factor usually fails to produce a greater desire for daughters. Clearly, there must be countervailing factors, such as the expense of dowries or the early loss of daughters' help through marriage, that lead parents in many Third World countries to perceive daughters to have relatively little net value compared to sons. Studies that attempt to identify "the determinants of sex preferences would be very worthwhile, especially in countries where highly lopsided preferences may act as a drag on fertility decline if and when demographic modernization occurs.
Four possible values to parents of children of either sex that may influence the total demand for children have been argued to reflect some aspect of gender inequality. These are ( 1 ) the value of children as insurance against a divorce; ( 2 ) their value.as validators or securers of women's position in the family; (3) their value for economic or political gain, that is, as a source of loyalty, labor, wealth, or household help; and (4) their value as "risk insurance," that is, as sources of economic support in widowhood, old age, or times of disaster.
C h i l d r e n As I n s u r a n c e Against Divorce. Dixon (1975) suggests that where women are economically dependent on men and where men have greater prerogatives than w o m e n to initiate a divorce, relatively large numbers of children may be viewed by w o m e n as one way to bind a husband to them, either because this will satisfy the husband's demand for children (or sons) or because it will create a sense of obligation to continue to support the wife. A study of slum w o m e n in Rabat, Morocco, conducted by Mernissi (1975) , however, suggests that children's value as insurance against a divorce may be conditioned by other factors. Mernissi found that even though children had indeed been seen as divorce insurance by w o m e n prior to their migration to Rabat, children lost this value once families moved to the city. The main reasons for this were the loss of a natal kin group that would enforce a woman's claim to her husband's support once she had borne him five or six children and the increasing value men placed on wives' sexuality in the urban context. In Rabat, w o m e n were interested in restricting their fertility so they would remain sexually attractive to their husbands. Their sexuality rather than their fertility was viewed as the best insurance against divorce.
In writing about Bangladesh, Lindenbaum (1981) has suggested that the value of children as insurance against divorce reflects the availability-to w o m e n of their extended kin network. Her observations, however, lead to the opposite conclusion from Mernissi's. In Bangladesh, where a woman's kin network is supposed to support her after a divorce, and a woman therefore does not have to fear a divorce as m u c h as she would otherwise, the value of children as anti-divorce insurance is said to be lower than where no such support exists (cf. Ackerman, 1964) . Thus the extent to which w o m e n have access to their natal kin group has more than one possible relationship to this particular value of children. Regardless of the availability of kin, however, w o m e n who enjoy relatively high control of material resources presumably find children less important as a form of anti-divorce insurance than do those w h o are economically dependent on a spouse. Whether this in turn contributes to a reduction in childbearing requires further study.
C h i l d r e n As Validators or S e c u r e r s o f W o m e n ' s P o s i t i o n in the Family. That children are important as a source of "status" to women is an idea found in the literature for some time (Blake, 1965) . Especially when a w o m a n must marry into an extended-kin household of strangers and must live without the economic or social support of her natal kin or without an independent economic base, she usually is without security or respect until she has borne at least one child or son (e.g., Srinivas, 1977) . Indeed, Wolf (1972) suggests that one of the most important ways w o m e n in this position can gain power is through their children (especially sons), something that presumably provides an incentive for relatively high fertility. In this view, the more that w o m e n are able to earn money or subsistence independently of the husband or his kin, or the less that they are removed from their own kin (physically, emotionally, or economically), the lower will be their need to secure or validate their position by bearing children (Dyson and Moore, 1983) . Islam also may be associated with women's need to secure a position in the family by childbearing (van de Walle and Ouaidou, t985), perhaps because w o m e n in Islamic cultures often live in seclusion and are economically dependent on male kin (Caldwell, 1986) .
It is important to recognize, however, that w h e n w o m e n have economic autonomy and social support from their natal kin, their demand for children may nonetheless be high..As Ware (1977) notes, in much of West Africa w o m e n are expected to be largely self-supporting and are rarely secluded within a household of strangers far from their own kin, yet they typically have very high fertilit3~ desires. In such cases, other values of children, not affected in the same way by economic independence or integration with natal kin, apparently take precedence.
C h i l d r e n ' s Value for E c o n o m i c Gain. There are several suggestions in the literature about the impact that gender inequality may have on the value of children for economic gain or support. One suggestion is that the more arduous is women's work (both domestic and extra-domestic) and the more it is normatively acceptable to use child labor in the household, the greater will be the economic value of children to their mothers (Oppong, 1983) . To be sure, whether the arduousness of women's work is an aspect of gender inequality rather than of economic or class position is unclear. Heavily burdened women may value children for their labor even when their work burdens are no greater than their husbands'.
A second suggestion focusing more clearly on gender inequality is that the more heavily women are involved in non-maternal roles (primarily, in productive work), the less they will value children as sources of support because of their ability to support themselves (Germain, 1975) . This idea seems plausible for women whose employment provides a relatively good income. It is less plausible for poor women, however, whose work, as studies by Bunster B. (1983) and others (e.g., Merrick and Schmink, 1983) suggest, often requires the assistance of children, either on the job (if the mother is self-employed) or in the home. For these women, it is quite conceivable that involvement in "alternatives" to the maternal role enhances, rather than reduces, the economic value of children. Thus, whether women,s economic independence has a positive or negative impact on the perceived labor value of children is likely to vary by economic class and with the nature of their employment.
A third suggestion as to how gender inequality may relate to children's economic value is found in Caldwelrs (1982, 1983) theory of the demographic transition. Caldwell argues that in pre-transition societies, children and other descendents have great value to a kin group's senior men because gender and age inequalities insure that these men reap the benefits of children's labor and loyalty (not just when children are young, but also when they reach adulthood). Caldwell in turn argues that children lose their economic value when the "emotional nucleation" of the family occurs, children becoming instead a net economic drain for the older generation. One aspect of the family's nucleation is the reduction of gender inequality, In Caldwell's theory, then, the degree of gender inequality within the family is indirectly related to children's economic value because it is associated with the family's general form. As families nucleate, gender inequality declines a n d children lose their economic value.
Cain (1982) has criticized this theory for failing to take into account the responsibility for child support that senior males, who reap the benefits of children's labor, f r e q u e n t l y shoulder. 9 To this criticism might be added another. While the e m o t i o n a l n u c l e a t i o n of the family w e a k e n s the ties b e t w e e n adults and their w i d e r kin group, it does n o t necessarily w e a k e n g e n d e r inequality or may at least leave m a n y forms of inequality intact. Indeed, the w e s t e r n conjugal family that Caldwell claims serves as a m o d e l for family change in the d e v e l o p i n g w o r l d has b e e n v i e w e d by m a n y authors as involving considerable g e n d e r inequality, especially in the form of w o m e n ' s e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c y o n their husbands. 1° W h e t h e r a r e d u c t i o n in g e n d e r inequality is either necessary or sufficient to i n d u c e a fertility change is thus unclear.
C h i l d r e n ' s V a l u e as R i s k I n s u r a n c e o r O l d -A g e S u pp o r t . Mead Cain (1978 , 1980 Cain, Khanam, and Nahar, 1979) has b e e n the major p r o p o n e n t of the idea that c h i l d r e n may have value to w o m e n as a form of "risk insurance," this value b e i n g d e t e r m i n e d in part by w o m e n ' s e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c y o n male family members. The particular setting he has emphasized is South Asia (Bangladesh and India), and he has related Bangladeshi w o m e n ' s n e e d for "risk insurance" in the form of c h i l d r e n to ( 1 ) their inability to fend for themselves economically, given the practice of purdah and the denial to w o m e n of e m p l o y m e n t opportunities; ( 2 ) the fairly great likelihood of their bec o m i n g widows, given wide age differences b e t w e e n spouses; ( 3 ) the absence of credit, social insurance, or state-provided support for the destitute; and ( 4 ) the b r e a k d o w n of the traditional extended-family syst e m in the face of increased poverty, such that w i d o w s can no longer rely o n their brothers-in-law for e c o n o m i c support. Cain suggests that this leaves w o m e n w i t h only o n e hedge against the possibility of a destitute widowhood, namely children, especially sons. (Bangladeshi w o m e n apparently feel that a g r o w n son will support them, e v e n if a brother-9 This criticism seems more relevant to Asia, where Cain has done most of his empirical research, than to sub-Saharan Africa, where Caldwell's original work on fertility was conducted. In Africa, women frequently are responsible for feeding and housing their children, even though it is their husband, senior brother, or father-in-law who reaps many of the benefits of these children. lo Part of the confusion here seems to be between changes in the pr/macy of the husbandwife relationship and changes in gender inequality per se. Kinship systems can shift from a focus on parent-child relationships to an emphasis on the conjugal relationship without economic inequality between the sexes disappearing (although this shift usually involves an increase in companionship between spouses). In fact, the opposite seems to occur in many parts of the Third World (and historically in the West): With a move to the conjugal family system, the wife's role in production often is reduced and her role in domestic activities increasingly emphasized as her "true calling" (see, e.g~, Hull, 1977; Degler, 1980) . What can be seen as an increase in women's economic dependency on their husbands, however, is indeed accompanied by a decline in fertility in many cases, as Caldweil predicts. Thus, whether certain forms of gender inequality are really relevant to children's economic value is unclear.
in-law will not; o n e w o n d e r s h o w long it will be before this tradition is also u n d e r m i n e d . ) Thus, in Cain's view, w o m e n ' s e c o n o m i c depend e n c y o n men, in c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h the n u c l e a t i o n of the family, increases children's value as risk insurance. Cain, Khanam, and Nahar, ( 1 9 7 9 ) suggest the persistence of high fertility in Bangladesh may in part reflect this relationship. 11 Although Cain's ideas are plausible, children's value to w o m e n as a form of risk i n s u r a n c e may ultimately have little to do with the persistence of high fertility in societies such as Bangladesh. To the e x t e n t that w o m e n in these societies are powerless, their voice in fertility decisions is unlikely to be strong. Should their h u s b a n d s or in-laws decide to restrict childbearing, it is hard to imagine they w o u l d be able to c o n t i n u e to bear c h i l d r e n to e n h a n c e their personal e c o n o m i c security. High fertility may persist in societies like Bangladesh only because m e n value sons or large families as m u c h as w o m e n do, though perhaps for different reasons. Thus, unless o n e can argue that g e n d e r inequality is the cause of men's desires for high fertility, too, the hypothesis that g e n d e r inequality p r o d u c e s high fertility by making c h i l d r e n valuable to their m o t h e r s for purposes of i n s u r a n c e against risk is questionable. 12
In sum, then, there are several plausible hypothesized effects of w o m e n ' s position o n particular values of children. W o m e n ' s e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c y may e n h a n c e the value of sons as risk assets and the value of children as p r o t e c t i o n against marital disruption or as securers of status or p o w e r w i t h i n the family. W h e t h e r these effects are likely to have a p r o n o u n c e d impact o n fertility is less clear, however. Some effects of w o m e n ' s position are hypothesized to operate because of strong son preferences, and whether such preferences influence fertility in most settings is questionable. Also, e v e n ff w o m e n ' s position strongly influ-H Cain attempts to test these ideas at an institutional level by analyzing country-level statistics from the Worm Fertility Surveys (Cain, 1984) . In this analysis, be relates the average age difference between spouses (his indicator of what he terms patriarchy, that is, the institutions that govern the degree of female economic dependency) to the total fertility rate (TFR) and to measures of son preferences. Although the results are consistent with this theory--the larger the age difference between spouses, the higher the TFR and the stronger the son preferences--the least satisfactory part of the analysis involves the linkage between son preferences anti fertility. (Cain's measure of son preferences, for example, shows Korea to have mild daughter preferences, rather than the extremely strong son preferences that most other studies find for that country.) As Cain himself recognizes, the use of the spousal age difference as an indicator of dependency and risk is also less than ideal. ~z That gender inequality lies behind men's high fertility desires is possible, as the section on gender preferences noted. Where the social system makes males more valuable than females, men may want sons--not just children in order to enhance their social position or increase their protection against risk. As was noted above, however, whether son preferences are responsible for high fertility in populations like Bangladesh's is questionable. ences a particular value of children, other conditions may influence alternative values of children differently, with the result that fertility fails to change as one would expect on the basis of gender inequality alone. Furthermore, w h e n gender inequality is very extreme, the value of children to w o m e n may have little impact on fertility because w o m e n will be unable to determine their o w n childbearing patterns. Studies of h o w gender inequality relates to fertility via the value of children need to pay close attention to these possibilities.
Costs o f C h i l d r e n
All of the child costs thought to be linked with female status (not all of them necessarily monetary) are opportunity costs, rather than direct costs. Three main hypothesized paths of influence are illustrated in Figure 2 . First, the more restricted married w o m e n are, the fewer their opportunities to engage in rewarding activities that compete with childbearing and hence the lower the opportunity costs of additional children. In other words, when w o m e n are secluded in the household, they lose little by bearing numerous children. When their autonomy permits them to engage in alternative activities, including remunerative employment, however, the opportunity costs of children are potentially greater.
Second, insofar as women's autonomy influences their education, it may influence the costs of children by affecting w o m e n ' s potential wage levels. (This is the dominant hypothesis of the New Home Economics approach to the determinants of fertility.) The higher women's 
Costs of Children
Hypothesized Effects of Female Autonomy and Other Variables on the Costs of Children potential w a g e levels are, the m o r e m o n e y t h e y ( a n d their families) forego w h e n their time is d e v o t e d to c h i l d b e a r i n g and rearing rather than to r e m u n e r a t i v e e m p l o y m e n t , In this way, greater a u t o n o m y for w o m e n m a y result in higher child costs and h e n c e l o w e r fertility.
Although this connection b e t w e e n female education and child costs has b e e n a r g u e d b y e c o n o m i s t s familiar w i t h the Third W o r l d (e.g., Standing, 1983) , the assumption implicit in this h y p o t h e s i s that w o m e n c a n n o t rear c h i l d r e n while simultaneously e n g a g e d in p r o d u c t i v e activities is questionable for m a n y Third W o r l d w o m e n , p e r h a p s for a majority o f t h e m ( M a s o n and Palan, 1981) 
w h i l e t h e y work, m e a n i n g that the opp o r t u n i t y costs they" face m a y b e no greater than those faced b y their rural counterparts. Thus, although these c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n female a u t o n o m y and child costs m a y b e c o m e m o r e i m p o r t a n t in the future, their c u r r e n t role in d e t e r m i n i n g fertility in m a n y Third W o r l d countries is debatable.
The third h y p o t h e s i z e d path t h r o u g h w h i c h female a u t o n o m y is said to influence child costs is b y affecting the nature of the husbandwife relationship. As Caldwell ( 1 9 8 3 ) and O p p o n g ( 1 9 8 3 ) have argued, female a u t o n o m y is associated w i t h a relatively egalitarian and companionate relationship b e t w e e n spouses. Couples w i t h an egalitarian relationship m a y in turn l o o k to each o t h e r for psychic and e m o t i o n a l satisfaction, rather than to their children, s o m e t h i n g that implicitly raises the psychic costs of children. A psychological emphasis on the conjugal relationship seems unlikely to play a major role in fertility decisions until very late in the d e m o g r a p h i c transition. Nevertheless, this possibility is w o r t h y o f further study in settings w h e r e family relations are beginning to reflect W e s t e r n influences.
~3 The study that is usually cited in support of the idea that even in the agricultural sectors of Third World countries, women may find it difficult to work and rear children simultaneously is an analysis of Malaysian data by DaVanzo and Lee (1983) . This study, however, is as consistent with the ease of combining maternal and productive responsibilities as with the opposite idea. DaVanzo and Lee report that a substantial proportion of women working in agriculture (about one-third) did their work unaccompanied by their younger children. ~hile this may mean that it would have been difficult to have children accompany them, it may also mean that it was unnecessary for their children to accompany them because of the availability of acceptable child care substitutes in the home. Also, a relatively large proportion of Malaysian agricultural workers are rubber tappers, a form of extractive work that makes demands on workers distinct from the more typical agricultural tasks in which Asian and African women engage (for example, rubber tapping is usually done very early in the morning, before children are awake). Thus, whether the Malaysian results can be generalized to most rural Third World women is unclear.
EFFECTS OF WOMEN'S POSITION ON FERTILITY R E G U L A T I O N A N D D E C I S I O N MAKING

Use of Contraception
Many of the relationships discussed thus far have implications for contraception, sterilization, and abortion, because they involve the demand for children, which when smaller than the supply of children may motivate deliberate fertility regulation. Here, however, we focus on hypotheses specifically relating gender inequality to contraceptive use. (The same processes may also affect the use of sterilization and abortion, although this is rarely discussed in the literature.) Figure 3 depicts the relevant hypotheses.
A key factor argued to intervene between women's autonomy and the use of contraception is the ability or willingness to engage in the innovative behavior (Caldwell, 1986) . Where women's autonomy is great, their education is likely to be relatively great, and better educated women are not only more likely to engage in innovation, but typically have more knowledge of contraceptive methods or of how to acquire them than do less educated women because of their literacy, greater familiarity with modern institutions, and greater likelihood of rejecting a fatalistic attitude toward life. There is good evidence that, for whatever reason, women's education does indeed promote the use of contraception in most developing countries outside of tropical Africa (Cochrane, 1979) . Autonomy may also influence the use of contraception by de- (Dyson and Moore, 1983) . Of course, dependency on in-laws will reduce the likelihood of contracepting only if in-laws oppose the restriction of fertility. This may not always be the case (Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell, 1982) . Female autonomy may also influence contraceptive use by determining the egalitarianism of the husband-wife relationship. Equality of spouses is supposedly" linked with the likelihood of their communicating about fertility control, which is in turn argued to influence the use of contraception or at least the effectiveness of its use. The evidence in support of this hypothesis is apparently weak, however (Beckman, 1983; Hollerbach, 1983) .
Finally, in some cultures, women's autonomy and status are said to influence contraceptive use by influencing the extent to which the couple abides by a sexual double standard. Where such a double standard exists--making it acceptable for husbands but not wives to have pre-or extra-marital sexual relations--men may worry that the use of female contraceptive methods will free their daughters or wives to violate this norm. A related idea is that men in cultures with a tradition of machismo will resist the use of contraception, not only because they find it important to insure a wife's sexual loyalty, but also because they believe frequent pregnancies provide proof of their sexual potency. There is some evidence to support this last hypothesis (Beckman, 1983) .
Factors E n t e r i n g into Fertility D e c i s i o n s There are two main ideas in the literature about the impact that changes in gender inequality will have on the terms in which fertility decisions are made. One is the idea that as husbands and wives b e c o m e more equal, the w4fe's fertility desires play an increasingly important role in fertility decisions. While this seems plausible, certain mitigating possibilities should be noted. Some cultures may give wives a relatively strong voice in fertility decisions, even though wives are given little power in other areas, because childbearing is regarded as a female domain. For example, this may explain why Egyptian wives' fertility preferences apparently have more impact on contraceptive use than do husbands' preferences (Haltouda et aL, 1983; cf. Knodel, Havanon, and Pramualratana, 1984 , for a similar pattern in much more egalitarian Thailand). Also, wives' increased voice in fertility decisions may have little impact on fertility if their fertility desires are similar to their husbands'. Although some scholars argue that husbands and wives typically have different fertility desires, at least in pre-transition settings (Caldwell, 1983) , the evidence suggests this frequently is not the case (Mason and Taj, 1987) . Further, even when the sexes disagree about family size, it is often women, not men, who want more children (Mason and Taj, 1987) .
The other main idea about the impact of gender relations on the terms of fertility decisions is that a more egalitarian relationship between the sexes is likely to increase the weight given to the wife's health and well-being in fertility decisions. Egalitarian couples are likely to worry about the health consequences for the wife of having an additional child, whereas men in male-dominated families are likely to decide about additional children in terms of their own needs and interests. Hollerbach (1983) reports there is some evidence to support this idea, although it is derived from relatively few studies and requires further confirmation. If further studies of this relationship are conducted, it will be important to learn whether increased concern with health consequences affects a couple's completed fertility or only the timing of their births.
SUMMARY
The most plausible hypotheses about the paths through which aspects of women's position may influence fertility in developing countries can be summarized by the five models shown in Figure 4 . These models suggest that women's position may influence fertility through child supply, child demand, a n d child costs.
First, women's autonomy is likely to be inversely related to the importance or urgency of marriage for daughters, something that should influence age at marriage and hence the supply of children. Second, in settings where w o m e n want fewer children than men do or have a more positive attitude toward fertility control, the greater is their autonomy, the more power they will have in fertUit3T decisions and the more likely they will be to engage in innovative behaviors, such as using m o d e m contraceptives. These should in turn reduce fertility by reducing either the demand for children or the psychic costs of fertility regulation.
Third, the greater is women's economic dependency, the more important children will be as security assets and the stronger will be preferences for sons. Under certain demographic conditions, the latter may help to maintain high fertility, as will the former under most demographic conditions. Fourth, the seclusion of w o m e n is likely to lower the opportunity costs of children. Insofar as female autonomy leads to higher levels of female education, it should increase the opportunity costs of children. Both of these should affect the demand for children.
And finally, the greater the equality of the sexes, the more the wife's health and well-being are likely to enter into fertility decisions. This means that where health considerations dictate limiting childbeari n g -o r lengthening interbirth intervals--higher female status may be associated with lower fertility-.
C O N C L U S I O N S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S
This paper has demonstrated the variety of paths through which aspects of gender inequality are hypothesized to influence fertility and the intermediate determinants of fertility. The extent to which w o m e n have autonomy from men's control in their day-to-day lives or are economically independent from male family members has been argued to affect their age at marriage, their desires for children, the costs of children, and the use of contraception. Although many of the hypothesized effects of women's position have yet to receive empirical support, and although some of them are less than completely plausible, gender inequality nonetheless seems likely to have s o m e influence on fertility. Certainly the idea that relations between the sexes influence fertility in developing countries is worthy of considerably more attention than it has received in the empirical literature to date.
One shortcoming of the review presented in this paper has been the failure to assess systematically h o w social context may condition the impact of women's position on fertility. There is plentiful evidence suggesting that the processes through which female status influences fertility indeed vary by context. At least two recent studies have found the impact on fertility of indicators of female autonomy greater where some degree of modernization has occurred than under pre-modern conditions (Jejeebhoy, 1986; Lloyd, 1986) . Cain ( 1 9 8 4 ) h a s also suggested that women's economic dependency on male family members should have implications for the decline of fertility only in conjugallyoriented family systems. Future studies need not only to examine female autonomy more directly than has been done in the past, but also to be sensitive to social context when they do so.
One of the most serious problems with past empirical studies of gender inequality and fertility has been a failure to measure the conceptually-relevant dimensions of gender inequality. Education and employment are the two most commonly used proxies for women's status or autonomy. As was noted earlier, the actual relationship of these variables to women's autonomy, resources, or status is problematic. Both women's level of schooling and the rate at which they engage in productive employment, moreover, tend to serve as proxies for other fertility determinants. For example, high levels of female schooling may indicate high child costs rather than a high level of female autonomy, a rise in child costs being one factor important for the decline of fertility both in contemporary Third World populations (Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell, 1982; Nag and Kak, 1984) and historically (Lindert, 1978) .
Other measures of female autonomy commonly used in past studies include household type (conjugal versus joint or stem), the age difference between husband and wife (e.g., Cain, 1984; Jejeebhoy, 1986) , and the relative responsibility of husband and wife for household decision making (as reported by wives, e.g., Hogan, Chamratrithirong, and Smith, 1986) . Each of these has proven problematic in at least some settings. For example, Sathar (1986) finds that nuclear family households in Pakistan have higher fertility levels than extended-kin households, a pattern seemingly contradictory to the usual assumption that wives in nuclear households enjoy more autonomy than do wives in (patrilineally) extended-kin households. Sathar's interpretation is that extended-kin households are likely to split apart when the fertility level of the constituent conjugal units becomes high. Thus household type may say more about past fertility levels than about wives' autonomy. Problems with wives' reports of conjugal decision making may also explain why Hogan, Chamratrithirong, and Smith, (1986) fail to find any decisive relationship between wives' decision-making power and fertility in Thailand.
Another problem with past studies of gender inequality and fertility has been their tendency to focus on individual-level cross-sectional relationships, rather than on aggregate, dynamic relationships. As Smith (1986) and others (Cain, 1984; Mason, 1984) have suggested, the extent of female autonomy, resources, or status is from some theoretical points of view a characteristic of social systems rather than of individuals. Most men and w o m e n in a given culture, community, or class experience the same gender-based opportunities and constraints. Studies of gender inequality and fertility consequently need to examine variability between relevant aggregates, not just between individual women. Relatively few studies have done this, however, and some that have done so have encountered other problems) 4
One type of study that would be valuable for understanding the links between female status and fertility is the intensive "controlled comparison" (see Caldwell, 1985 , for similar suggestions). By this, I mean a study focusing on a relatively few communities or aggregates that have many factors in c o m m o n but vary in their institutions of gender. Each community or aggregate is then studied intensively using a variety of data collection techniques, including surveys and participant observation.
Such studies offer at least two advantages over large-scale aggregate studies. First, because the number of aggregates is kept small enough for a single observer or small research team to study each unit intensively, the measurement of complex and elusive phenomena is more feasible than in a large-scale study. The measurement of variables not normally collected or published for larger aggregates is also straightforward. Second, controlled comparisons offer the advantage of permitting the researcher to examine the impact of gender inequality on fertility or mortality while minimizing the "noise" created by covariates. Because the units involved are chosen deliberately so as to reduce other sources of variation, attention can be focused on female autonomy, status, or resources. Several examples of controlled comparisons can be found in the literature, including Mead Cain's work (Cain, Khananl, and Nahar, 1979) and a study in progress by Safilios-Rothschild and Mburugu (1986) . Other types of multi-level analyses also seem promising for understanding how gender inequality's impact on fertility varies according to social context (Smith, 1986) . Sophisticated statistical methods for conducting multi-level analyses have recently been developed (Mason, Wong, and Entwisle, 1983; Wong and Mason, 1985) , making quantitat4 One of the most ambitious aggregate-level studies of women's status and fertility was conducted by Ward (1984) , who used a world system's theoretical framework. Unfortunately, Ward's failure to consider developing countries separately from developed countries renders her results difficult to interpret. Aggregate studies conducted by Cain (1984;  see footnote 11) and by Safilios-Rothschild (1985) are also difficult to interpret and at best provide suggestive rather than definitive evidence of the impact of women's position on fertility. Social P o s i t i o n a n d Fertility tive a p p r o a c h e s m o r e r e l i a b l e t h a n in t h e past. T o b e sure, g o o d indic a t o r s o f f e m a l e status m a y n o t always b e available for s u c h analyses. In p r i n c i p l e , h o w e v e r , analyses that s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e x a m i n e t h e i m p a c t o f social c o n t e x t a n d i n d i v i d u a l s i t u a t i o n o n fertility c a n p r o v i d e a c l e a r e r p i c t u r e o f g e n d e r i n e q u a l i t y ' s i m p a c t o n fertility t h a n h a v e studies c o nd u c t e d o n l y at t h e i n d i v i d u a l o r a g g r e g a t e level. Certainly, r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e m e t h o d o l o g i e s that are u s e d , t h e j o i n i n g o f s o c i o l o g y and d e m o gr a p h y in f u r t h e r studies o f g e n d e r i n e q u a l i t y a n d fertility w o u l d b e w o r t h w h i l e .
